Trends and differentials in Moslem fertility
Nagi, M.H.
Journal of Biosocial Science 16(2): 189-204
1984
ISSN/ISBN: 0021-9320 PMID: 6725301 DOI: 10.1017/s0021932000014978Document Number: 375028
Demographers have long recognized that values concerning fertility are embedded in religious beliefs and that the high fertility of some societies is, in part, a response to religious doctrine. This paper examines data on fertility levels in 33 Moslem countries between 1960 and 1980. The analysis is based on demographic and socioeconomic data from the regularly published statistics by the United Nations, the World Bank, the Population Reference Bureau, the Population Council and the World Fertility Surveys. Fertility measures include crude birth rate, total fertility rate and age-specific birth rate, and the % change in them between 1960-80. The analysis focuses on: 1) the current status of Moslem fertility in comparison to non-Moslem countries in the same region. It is suggested that the subordinate position of women in the family is responsible for maintaining a high level of fertility among the former; 2) the emerging fertility differentials among Moslem countries; and 3) how much of the recent fertility declines in some Moslem countries is associated with modernization variables and with family planning efforts. The results indicate that: 1) Moslem fertility remains universally high and is generally higher than in non-Moslem countries in the same region; and 2) very few Moslem countries have succeeded in bringing down their level of fertility to justify a search for the predictors of Moslem fertility levels. The analysis shows, however, that the fertility transition appears to be underway in at least 5 of the Moslem countries. The striking finding is that, in these 5, it bagan under adverse socioeconomic and demographic conditions. Paradoxically, the countries which rank at the top of the development indicators, are not those where fertility transitions began to take place. Clearly, large differences in the level of development exist among the 33 countries, and it seems safe to conclude that there is no easily definable threshold of social and economic progress that is required for fertility to begin to decline. This leads to the conclusion that in spite of a sufficient range of variations in the economic and social correlates of fertility, the corresponding fertility variables in these countries do not suggest that the reproductive behavior of Moslem women has reacted to such variations; efforts directed towards stronger family planning programs are clearly related to fertility decline. The current evidence suggests that the argument that religion, social customs and ideological factors prevent the possibility of fertility decline in Moslem poulations, needs to be modified.