Regional Economic Integration and Article XXIV of the GATT
Junichi Goto; Koichi Hamada
Review of International Economics 7(4): 555-570
1999
ISSN/ISBN: 0965-7576 DOI: 10.1111/1467-9396.00181Document Number: 313543
This paper studies the economic impact of regionalism under the realistic assumptions of constant tariffs and asymmetric bloc formation. As an extension of the Krugman framework, the impact is decomposed into several components, each of which has a clear economic implication. Economic integration definitely worsens outsiders' welfare even if the external tariffs of the bloc are unraised. Bloc members' welfare first increases with the expansion of the bloc; but when about half of the world is united into the bloc, welfare begins to decrease. Simulation results shed some light on the incentive structure of major participants, who face various configurations of regional integration.