The fetus between abortion and protection of life
Ostendorf, H.
Beitrage Zur Gerichtlichen Medizin 40: 29-33
1982
ISSN/ISBN: 0067-5016 PMID: 7165649 Document Number: 188787
Despite the distinctions made in the Abortion Act Paragraph 218 et seq. StGB overlaps and gaps occur with the transition from the protection of "unborn life" to the protection of "born life" which leads to restrictions in the law concerning legal protection of life. These problems occur particularly with organ transplants from and medical experiments on living fetuses following legal abortion. In order to afford an optimal protection of life, a clear definition is necessary. Here, however, the reduced penalty, compared with born life, according to Paragraph 218 et seq. StGB must also be considered. The following points are valid. 1) When medically indicated, the chance of an early birth as an alternative to abortion should be carefully considered. 2) The extension of the legal protection of life into the birth process cannot be transferred to the process of abortion because of the structure of the law; i.e., in abortion, the legal protection of life and integrity come into force only after delivery of the fetus. 3) Following delivery of the fetus, Paragraphs 211 et seq. and 223 et seq. StGB come into force whether or not there is a chance of life; i.e., organ transplants from and medical experiments on living fetuses after legal abortion are, in principle, forbidden. 4) With legal abortion, the doctor is not obliged, except when medically indicated, to resuscitate a living fetus. The time limits for an abortion according to Paragraph 218 exclude any chance of life so that, following the principles of passive euthanasia, there is no special responsibility or general duty to save that life. (author's)